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Introductory remarks 
In order to address contemporary conflicts, law sometimes invokes, explicitly or 
implicitly, past principles, past ideas, concepts and narratives. Why? And what is 
going on when law feels the need for memory? These are the issues this paper wishes 
to address; its aim is to argue that when law remembers, changes are at stake. 
Remembering is not conservative, not necessarily at least: on the contrary, it is one of 
the expressions that movement takes on in law. 'Movement' is nothing but the search 
for 'justice' that animates law1
 
. Often, the act of remembering – a movement towards 
the past – acknowledges that the conflicts of the present require new balances, new 
images, new principles. When law remembers, an opportunity is being opened to legal 
interpreters to renew their vocabulary and their established set of ideas, and to re-tune 
their connection with the times. 
 The context of this reflection: Antidiscrimination Law and the Markets in the 
European Process of Integration  
The field to which I intend to apply this hypothesis is that of the relationship between 
law and the market, particularly between antidiscrimination law and the market, 
within the European Process of Integration.  
 
In the context of the European Process of Integration, anti-discrimination law is seen 
as a market friendly-tool, aiming to enhance and support the market, and not to 
protect from it the goods or socially important ends that the market on its own would 
otherwise depreciate or harm. 
It does not take much to understand why anti-discrimination law and the European 
Process of Integration go hand in hand: after all, the Union was born to give life to a 
fair competitive common market; fair competition requires parity; and anti-
discrimination aims for parity of treatment. In Europe, we call this ‘the economic aim’ 
of anti-discrimination law; but we would be better off calling it the ‘utilitarian’ 
understanding of anti-discrimination law, which is not only accepted, but valued and 
promoted, precisely because it works beneficially for the markets.  
No surprise then if in the EU’s conception there are never markets that discriminate, 
but there are laws, traditions, social habits and cultural convictions reflected in law 
that do so. Anti-discrimination law is entrusted with the mission of helping markets to 
shed all the discriminatory elements encapsulated within national legislation and 
social traditions. 
Gender policies offer the best explanation of this approach’s multiple implications. 
For decades, many national ‘protective’ legislations had accorded to women special 
treatments in order to compensate (in terms for example of a better retirement scheme 
or more flexible treatment at work) their ‘double burden’ (the contribution that 
working women make to family life as well). Then the nation states suddenly learned 
from the EU that this kind of legislation is discriminatory, inasmuch as it repeats 
stereotypes that condemn women to the margins of the employment market. As the 
ECJ is fond of repeating, "as parents, men and women are equal" (Commission vs 
France, C-212/86) and "neither men nor women have a special relationship with 
family care or work" (Griesmar, Case C-366/99). Only pregnancy, the delivery of a 
baby, and breastfeeding can justify special treatment in favour of women (Dekker, 
Case C-177/88), passing the test of the new European notion of gender equality.  
In other words, traditions, social attitudes and national legislation (if not national 
constitutional law itself) have played a regressive and negative role, while markets, 
supported by the anti-discrimination protection, have played the transforming and 
progressive role: that of the space where women find their emancipation from past 
gender roles that tied them to the family and housework2
Of course, along with the special treatment of working women, the idea itself that 
workers are entitled to social protection has been banned from today’s European 
political speech. Working women were the prototype of the protected worker; the 
latter was arguably the true target of anti-discrimination policies and case law. So at 
least many critics say. Cutting the anti-discrimination protection down to nothing but 
a chance to enter the marketplace came at the cost of losing a sound set of past social 
protective law, hindered the adoption of new ones, and ended up explicitly 
subordinating rights to the market. But what counts, for the purposes of this 
presentation at least, is the official ‘rhetoric’ justifying this. Forms and contents of 
working people's rights have to be tailored to the market's needs and priorities, the EU 
. 
stresses, because a well-functioning, fully competitive, and thereby non-
discriminating market will do good for all of society. It will offer everyone freedom 
from past norms that limit their autonomy and their quest for self-development, 
granting not merely economic chances, but chances for self-fulfilment, self-
empowerment, and social inclusion. 
 
 
 
The Feryn case 
The EUCJ's established doctrine (the marketplace, naturally non-discriminating as it 
is, cures the ills of a discriminating society) seemed to be put at risk in 2008, when the 
Feryn case forced the Court to openly grapple with the discriminatory face of the 
market.  
The facts of the case were startling enough. Feryn is a Belgian firm specialized in the 
sale and installation of up-and-over doors and sectional doors. Seeking to recruit 
fitters, the firm had placed a large vacancy sign on its premises. Only Moroccans 
responded. Interviewed by some Belgian newspapers and on Belgian national 
television, Mr. Pascal Feryn, one of the firm’s directors, had declared: 
 
“ Apart from these Moroccans, no one else had responded to our notice in two 
weeks…. But we aren’t looking for Moroccans. Our customers don’t want them. They 
have to install up-and-over doors in private homes, often villas, and those customers 
don’t want them coming into their homes.” 
“We have many of our representatives visiting customers …. Everyone is installing 
alarm systems and these days everyone is obviously very scared. It is not just 
immigrants who break in. I won’t say that, I’m not a racist. Belgians break into 
people’s houses just as much. But people are obviously scared. So people often say: 
“no immigrants”…. I must comply with my customers’ requirements. If you say: “I 
want a particular product or I want it like this or like that” and I say: “I am not doing 
it, I’ll send these people”, then you say: “I don’t need that door”. Then I’m putting 
myself out of business. We must meet our customers’ requirements. This isn’t my 
problem. I didn’t create this problem in Belgium. I want the firm do well and I want 
us to achieve our turnover at the end of the year, and how do I do that? I must do it 
the way the customer wants it done!”3
 
 
It was the Belgian body for the promotion of equal treatment that brought proceedings 
against Mr Feryn, and the case ended up before the Court. The Court ruled in the case 
by saying that the fact that an employer states publicly that he will not recruit 
employees of a certain ethnic or racial origin amounts to direct discrimination within 
the meaning of Council Directive 2000/43/EC, implementing the principle of equal 
treatment between individuals irrespectively of their racial or ethnic origins. 
Central to the ruling are two points. Firstly, the moral it affirms, which is that the 
businessperson is not excused by the fact that his discriminatory hiring policy is 
driven not by a discriminatory intent, i.e. by his own discriminatory preferences or 
personal inclinations, but by social conventions, considered irrefutable; second is the 
line of reasoning followed by the Court in reaching its conclusions. Recognizing an 
act of direct discrimination in Mr. Pascal Feryn’s speech implied going far beyond the 
letter of the Directive. There was no identifiable complainant who had become victim 
of Mr Feryn discriminatory speech: Directive 2000/43/EC states that direct 
discrimination occurs when “one person is treated less favourably than another”. The 
Court went far beyond the letter; and ruled that the lack of an identifiable complainant 
did not prevent concluding that there was direct discrimination, because: “the aim of 
the Directive is to foster the conditions for a socially inclusive labour market”, and 
this aim would be hard to achieve if the scope of the Directive were limited to cases 
where “a victim” is identifiable. In other words, the Court stated that the aims of the 
Directive (developing a socially inclusive labour market) are put at risk by behaviours 
like that of Mr. Feryn. Reasoning in this manner, the Court achieved the goal of 
affirming anti-discrimination protection against the interests of a single businessman, 
but in the name of the market’s interests (in the name of a socially inclusive labour 
market), not in the name of non-market values (such as rights, dignity, equality).  
Notwithstanding the Court’s conclusion, the facts that gave origin to Feryn are 
certainly more consistent with the opinion of a number of scholars who share the 
view, opposed to the Court's traditional assumptions, that anti-discrimination law 
should be better understood, rather than as an instrument protecting the market's 
interests, as an instrument protecting goods (equality, dignity) that markets, in the 
name of their quest for profit, could and often do harm. A few years ago, Cass 
Sunstein noted that in a racist society, it is certainly more convenient for employers to 
discriminate than not to discriminate. Therefore, he maintains, “a legal system 
committed to an anti- discrimination principle might in some cases restructure market 
arrangements so as to put members of disadvantaged groups on a plane of equality"4. 
Many European scholars do share these views. They see in the ‘economic aim’ of EU 
anti-discrimination law (which was not born to protect rights against the market but to 
enhance markets) a sort of youthful error of the Process of European Integration. Now 
that the EU is no longer a common market only, but a political, monetary, and cultural 
union, mainstream scholarship maintains that it is time for the Court to adopt, in its 
decisions, a strongly rights-oriented attitude capable of saying aloud that 
antidiscrimination protects rights, not the market's interests. 
So much did Feryn appear inevitably to lead the Court to admit, for the first time in its 
history, that anti-discrimination law and market can be in conflict, that the General 
Advocate in his opinion on the Feryn Case, in response to a defence that had based its 
argument on: “it is not me that is racist, but society”, quoted Sunstein by saying: “all 
of this only tells us that markets don’t cure discrimination”. But the Court, as we have 
seen, did not pick up the Advocate General’s point and, facing the challenge of Feryn, 
rebuilt its stronghold that apparently been placed in crisis on the basis of the same 
case: anti-discrimination norms have market-based objectives. 
The moral of the case is that anti-discrimination law can go against the interests of 
business and profit, but when it cooperates with the market’s ends, it does the market 
good. Now, in what sense is it plausible to confirm that anti-discrimination law is 
good for the market even when it goes against the interests of business and profit? 
What can be said about such an apparently paradoxical statement?  
When we ask ourselves this, we discover the hidden role that memory plays in Feryn. 
 
 
The hidden work of Memory: looking for another model of relationship between 
law and the market 
There is a simple, elementary, old, and often forgotten sense in which law has been 
considered good for the market: law is good for the market when it protects the 
market from profit that is illicitly earned. And the profit that is illicitly earned is that 
which evades pacts and agreements, whose respect and fulfilment enable the very 
existence of a civil society. Even if it goes against the market’s interests, law is good 
for the market when it protects this latter from that profit which degenerates the 
quality of the exchanges – of economic and social exchanges at the same time, since 
they are bonded together. Profit diminishes the quality of community life when it is 
the fruit of fraudulent activities, illicit agreements, deceitful advertising or the 
manipulation of food products. Or, as in the case in point, when it is earned by giving 
in to the customers’ deteriorated tastes, by businessmen who, calling themselves the 
victims of such clients, only corroborate and legitimize their attitudes in the name of 
profit. When abusive speech takes place, abusive exchanges abound. 
In a word, law does good for the market when law reminds the market that it is part of 
society. Indeed, when we think of the market as a part of society, we immediately 
realize that the acts of a corrupt or dishonest businessperson at the same time harm 
commercial activities, and do wrong. And here memory is at work: the memory of 
conceptions about the relationship between law, economics and society, that existed 
in the past, and were then forgotten, but still make sense. 
By reprising the affirmation by which anti-discrimination law is good for the market 
and for this reason the Directive should be interpreted extensively, the ECJ assumes a 
position that would sound familiar to ancient Roman jurists and to those of the Middle 
Ages, and certainly to Adam Smith: the market’s activities are not exempt from the 
need for a moral position, and the amount of and the quality of ethics that the market 
exhibits, is taken from and then given back to society. That is: the market is a social 
being, it takes place in society and is part of it. It is for this reason that Feryn is unable 
to defend himself by saying that it is all society’s fault. Because his business is also 
part of society. And no one understands this better that the European Court of Justice, 
whose anti-discrimination doctrine, by insisting on the inclusion, cohesion and well-
being that market is able to provide, has always relied on the market’s sociability. 
That the market (and the businessman) should be prudent and honest was indeed a 
central idea in commercial law (lex mercatoria), the complex of prescriptions and 
statements, mostly originating from ancient Roman Law interpreted in view of the 
needs of newer economic exchanges, put together and continuously updated and 
evolved by the work of Medieval and modern jurisprudence; and spread throughout 
continental Europe by the cosmopolitan jurists of that age’s teaching activities and 
professional councils. 
 
“In the Middle Ages the problem of the morality of markets was posed in relation to 
the emergence of a new kind of mercantile man who anticipates the idea of the 
entrepreneur in the modern sense. The first period of the Italian communal age (12th -
13th centuries) offers the pure model of a constitutional-economic order – based on 
free competition – without economic legislation. Control is delegated to codes of 
ethical conduct and to the jurisdictions of the professional orders, the corporations. 
Corporations’ statutes constantly affirmed the duty to operate fairly (bene et legaliter 
were the Latin words, which meant: honestly and respectfully of the rule of law), 
without fraud or deception; corresponding to this principle was the general 
prohibition of unfair competition and monopoly”5
 
. 
In Feryn, apparently reminiscent of the Roman and Medieval warning of honesta 
utilitas (“to earn honestly”), the ECJ individuates, remembers and rediscovers the 
possibility of a close, undivided relationship between laws and economics, a 
relationship that harks back to ethical grounds common to the rationality of law and 
economics (the honesta utilitas does not mean honeste vivere, of “honestly living”) 
that throughout history has cemented a bond between the two fields.   
Having insisted for over two decades on painting the market as an important place for 
socialization, the Court of Justice recalls in Feryn the obligations that are connected to 
this position. Society is the environment in which human interactions take place; if the 
market is society, then the exchanges that take place in it, the quality of these 
exchanges, are the moments that constitute the social order: abuses that take place in 
the market therefore represent an attack upon the social order. The honesty and 
correctness demonstrated by the market generates virtue in society, and vice versa. 
The market is not separated from or without responsibility to the rest of the social 
order: they are reciprocally linked.  
In this way, anti-discrimination law corresponds to market ends without automatically 
giving the market license to dynamism, development and progress. It is not an 
instrument for the market to pursue its own ends. Instead, it commits the market to 
abide by probity and honestly, which, as Adam Smith taught, are the sign of a 
“civilized and commercial society”.  
In the Feryn judgment, through the historical breadth of the adjective ‘fair’, 
economics’ law and rationality rediscover themselves as connected with those social 
and legal rules that shape, elaborate and model the idea of ‘honesty’. Somewhere, 
behind and beneath the hyper-technocratic construction of the Common Market, lies 
the remembrance of a humanistic understanding of economics. And the Court admits 
that, today, we are in need of it.  
 
 
 
From Memory to Change 
When law remembers, changes are heralded, and the necessity of new understandings 
is acknowledged. Actually, we are in need of new scenarios in which to imagine the 
relationship between law, society and the market. Feryn says that both the alternatives 
we are accustomed to discuss (markets cure discrimination and discrimination law is 
an instrument that serves the market’s ends; the market does not cure discrimination, 
and anti-discrimination law is the instrument for state authorities to protect against the 
immoral market’s good and ends it would otherwise harm) have become useless in the 
face of the present state of things.  
Those alternatives stem from the same origin and say the same thing: that markets are 
allowed to be detached from ethics. From mercantilism onwards, the rationalist 
utilitarian mentality that created the homo oeconomicus prevailed. Contrary to what 
had happened to the medieval merchant, the homo oeconomicus was given a 
rationality divorced from the ethics that for centuries had provided common ground 
for law and economics, anchoring both to society.  
Once constructed on the artificial rationality of homo oeconomicus, economics was 
separated from law, and vice versa. Being rational to economic ends took the place of 
being prudent, honest, and fair. This separation historically manifested itself in two 
ways: in the idea that the law should protect society from the market, and in the idea 
that the law should be subordinated to the market. These two opposing ideas have a 
common premise: the economy follows its own rationality, a self-containing 
rationality based on profit and indifferent to, or autonomous from, the rationality 
which governs the remaining social exchanges and interactions. We recognize the 
operating of these ideas in the welfare state principles adopted by many European 
countries in the post-World War II era, to which those who say that antidiscrimination 
law is a matter of rights to be protected against the market still refer. Consciously or 
not, those who reason in this way repeat paradigms that were established after the 
second Industrial Revolution, and that Karl Polanyi explained in his book 'The great 
Transformation' of 19446
Now the time has come to reflect on how puzzling the results of this were: both 
markets and society have their own laws – economic laws for markets, legal laws for 
societies – but the two systems are not supposed to be joined by common values or 
interests; only, if the state is strong enough, able enough, it will hopefully force 
markets to 'restructure' their arrangements in the name of interests, goods and ends 
that the market neither recognizes nor cares for. But what happens when states and 
government are not strong enough to counter the market, or not willing enough, which 
is what is happening today? As lawyers, are we doomed to certify that rights are going 
to disappear, because the authority, the political power structured as governmental 
authority, that was supposed to protect them, has died? 
: nation states allowed self-regulating capitalism to exist, 
allowed it to pursue its ends, but kept for themselves a precise role, that of protecting 
society against the potentially socially disruptive market's aptitudes. The adoption of 
social protection legislations said that societal concerns are for the state, for public 
authorities, for politics. And law was seen as a product of the state, the instrument it 
used to protect society against the market.  
Making use of memory, we could begin to abandon the intellectual construction 
according to which law and economics are separated, pertain to different spheres, 
follow different ends; and we could reactivate, as Feryn suggests to us, the idea of the 
market as an order, which is founded upon, and in need of, respect for some basic 
principles or values of coexistence, starting from the words that connect us. A 
functional market requires a well-ordered society, reflects it, is part of is constitution; 
a functional market is one that accepts the obligations that tie it to society. It is 
because “at the very end, the economic order is not isolated from public morality” 7 
that Mr Feryn will not make money from the racist inclination of Belgian society and 
his discriminatory speech will not be approved or considered inoffensive. 
Reminiscent of the pre-modern link between law, society and the market, Feryn 
provides for us – together with its critical potential – a mentality of “the useful results 
in a close relationship with the fair”8
 
: a paradigm able to rediscover that law and 
markets are not detached, but connected, through the medium of ethics. Markets are 
reminded that of course the economy obeys its laws, but these have to be connected 
to, and responsive to, shared social values – that it to say to the living world of needs, 
interests, views and mentalities amid which markets exist. 
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